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Understanding Nepali nationalism 
(REVISED APRIL 2016) 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the foundations of Nepali nationalism and its articulation in 
contemporary Nepal. It makes informed readings of the historical antecedents of Nepali 
national identity and argues that Nepali national identity was forged in an attempt to create 
and maintain a boundary with ‘outsiders’ – mainly India and China. Data collected through 
online content analysis of the editorial commentary pages of two Nepali print media, 
followed by in-depth interviews, show that in the changed political context, the boundary still 
persists though its narrative has changed. This paper argues that the expression of Nepali 
nationalism can be understood as the maintenance of this boundary; its forms and articulation 
shaped by the changing political contexts.  
 




Understanding Nepali nationalism 
 
The ‘nation’ has remained one of the most significant markers of identity in the modern 
world. It bears great importance in the articulation of group identity. Different attributes, 
symbols and images signify the existence of a ‘nation’, and scholars have defined ‘nation’ as 
an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1999); a function of ‘modernity’ (Gellner 1983), 
‘bounded entity’ (Smith 1991), and an ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).   
Most of these concepts place importance on the cultural foundation of a nation and  uphold 
the traditional political sense of a nation as, ‘a community of sentiment which would 
adequately manifest itself in a state of its own’ (Weber 1948 cited in Smith 2008: 26).  
However, the existence of political factors in the expression of nationalism is a stronger 
element, which is why some scholars consider nationalism to be a political movement that 
has a cultural dimension (Hutchinson 1999).  Acknowledging the contribution of both 
cultural and political elements in the construction of nationalism, this paper argues that 
nationalism in Nepal is an expression of its ‘objective’ differences with the outsider to create 
and maintain a boundary. 
 
The paper applies a transactional approach to nationalism which focusses on human 
transactions, that is, on exchanges and relationship between human groups.  It exemplifies 
Barth’s (1981) theorisation of ethnicity which views ethnic groups as socially constructed 
and a form of boundary which is framed through  interaction with the ‘Others’. Barth (1981) 
argues that an ethnic group cannot exist in isolation:  its formation and continuation is 
dependent upon their relationship with ‘Others’, which plays an important role in creating the 
boundary (Barth 1981).  This paper shows that the idea of Nepali ‘nation’ has developed vis-
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à-vis its interactions with external factors, mainly India and to a lesser extent with China, and 
as a result, considerable reference is made to external elements in the articulation of Nepali 
national identity. The Nepali case maintains that national identification is not formed 
independently but it is strongly informed by the nation’s interaction with and perception of 
the external ‘Other’. This paper contributes in understanding the nature of Nepali nationalism 
in new ways, as the earlier accounts of Nepali nationalism have treated nationalism either as 
a belief or an ideology that involves an individual identifying with one's nation, and the role 
of external elements has been largely downplayed.  
 
This study is important and timely as the Nepali state has been continuously modernising 
through various constitutional changes in the last 60 years. The most revolutionary change 
took place in 2006 when Nepal abandoned the traditional Hindu monarchy and that has great 
implications for its ‘national’ character and the way the new Nepali nation is imagined. 
Hutchinson (2001) writes that state modernisation ignites competing ethnic traditions with 
their different versions of community, and it is important for nationalists to legitimise both 
traditionalism and innovation. Thus, he considers it important for researchers to sensitise the 
persisting tensions in modern polities between secular national cultures and older religious-
based heritages. Nepal’s current situation is ideal for such a study and the tension between 
the outgoing and incoming polities is high.  
  
This paper begins by providing a commentary on polity that dominated the ‘national’ 
narrative of ‘Nepaliness’ or ‘Nepali identity’ in recent history. It is important to look into the 
past because ‘sociological explanation is necessarily historical’ and we can construct a new 
world on the basis of what our predecessors have constructed for us (Abrams 1982: 2-3).  The 
latter part is an analysis of public discourse in the editorial commentaries of two Nepali 
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newspapers. The study is strongly informed by the new socio-political changes triggered by 
various internal and external factors in Nepal.  
 
Understanding nations and nationalism 
The concept of ‘nation’ has been explained in a variety of ways. The study of ‘nation’ and 
nationalism can be divided into two important paradigms that dominate scholarship - i) the 
primordialist approach that supposes that ‘nation’ is a primordial category, or one founded 
upon primordial attachments, and ii) the modernist approach that supposes ‘nation’  to be a 
modern ideology and movement. There are different variants of both of these approaches. 
Some primordialists believe that ethnic ties and nationalisms are derived from individual 
reproductive drives which find their expression in ‘nepotistic’ behaviour in order to maximise 
their inclusive fitness (Van den Berghe 1995). For other primordialists the cultural ‘givens’ 
of kinship, language, religion, race and territory provide foci for overriding attachments 
(Shils, 1957; Geertz 1973).  However, Smith (2000) believes there are two principal flaws  in 
the primordialist approach: i) they fail to explain how we extrapolate from small kin groups 
to the much larger and extended communities of ethnie or nation; and ii) they neglect the 
considerable social and cultural changes that transform the character of the communities 
which coalesce around them. 
  
In opposition to the primordialists, the modernist paradigm puts forward a more compelling 
approach to the nation.  Modernist explanations have several forms that come associated with 
the basic idea of modernism: for example socio-cultural, economic, political, ideological and 
constructionist.  The most vocal scholar to propound the modernist approach is Ernest 
Gellner  who in his 1964 book Thought and Change outlined the new theory of nationalism 
that focussed on the effect of uneven global moderninsation and argued that nationalism is a 
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product of industrial society, triggered by the spread of education. Tom Nairn (1981) has 
further developed Gellner’s theory to argue that the uneven development of capitalism caused 
by imperialism stimulates nationalism. In contrast to Gellner’s idea that demands cultural 
homogeneity, Nairn’s idea is based on heterogeneity: it appeals to the people as a whole and 
identifies the nation with the people.  
 
However, Hobsbawm (1999) challenges the basic premises of Gellner and Nairn by arguing 
that urbanization and industrialization undermine the condition that breeds ethnically, 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous groups’ desire for nationalism.  Nairn and 
Gellner’s economic theory of nationalism is also challengeable because they lay too much 
emphasis on economic factors and ignore socio-cultural conditions. Nationalism can flourish 
in all kinds of economic milieu: among rich and poor populations, in stagnant and mobile 
societies, and in backward and advanced regions (Smith 2000).  Thus, Smith (2000) 
considers that rather than economic or social discontent, it is the ethnic and cultural ties on 
which a claim to nationalism is based. For Smith (1991: 14-15), the nation signifies a cultural 
and political bond, uniting in a single political community all who share an historic culture 
and homeland. Nonetheless, one important flaw in his approach is the question of how a large 
entity like ‘nation’ would be based on ethnic bonding and how one can explain the existence 
of many ‘multinational’ nations, for example, India.   
 
The above question equally applies to Nepal.  According to the 2011 census there are a total 
of 64 ethnic and 58 caste groups in Nepal (Sharma 2012) and there is a great cultural division 
within a single group as well. Although ethnicity invokes a sense of rootedness and ancient 
origins, the existence of many ethnic groups also displays competing conceptions of descent, 
history, culture and territory (Hutchinson 2001: 83). As such the modernists’ proclivity to 
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view nations as culturally homogenous and culture as ‘value free’ (Hutchinson 2001: 83) is 
not well founded and  does not provide a full answer to the question of what binds a nation 
together – specially for a multi-ethnic country like Nepal.   
 
If we are to consider the relationship between nations and ethnic groups, we must focus on 
some more essential process, which is the spontaneous construction of ethnic identities as a 
result of group interaction, a phenomenon which obviously occurs in both the modern and 
pre-modern world (Conversi 1995). Barth (1981) provides some important insights into this 
process. He takes the view that ethnic distinctions are maintained and asserted through 
interaction and interdependence. According to him, ethnic groups are categories of ascription 
and identification by the actors themselves and the nature and continuity of their self-identity 
depends on the maintenance of a boundary with the ‘Other’ or the outsider. According to 
him, the cultural feature that signal the boundary may change over time and with greater 
interaction and exposure the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be 
transformed, however, there is always a boundary between members and outsiders.    
 
Conversi (1995: 77) calls this approach transactionalism and advances the point that 
‘nationalism is both a process of border maintenance and creation’. It focuses on human 
transactions and believes that all forms of interaction need norms and regulations, and 
borders represent the core of such regulations (Conversi 1995). It argues that borders are 
essential to all human processes, both at the individual and the social level, and all processes 
of identity construction are simultaneously border-generating and border-deriving. The 
approach appreciates the role of internal ascription, i.e, the construction of identity by 
citizens with the nation (Smith 2009) and also the development of the nation within the larger 
international community (Tilly 2005). It divulges into the construction of national identity 
 7 
 
within a particular historical context and in relations to each other (Maguire, 2015), for 
instance, Greenfeld (1995) notes that the definition of the nation is at least in part, determined 
by the perceived place of the nation in relation to other nations but maintain the notion of the 
nation as a primarily self-defining group.  
 
Scholars have looked into nationalism from a boundaries perspective with a variety of 
disciplinary positions such as social psychology, social identity, social movements, creation 
of inequality and class differences, and cultural practices (Breuilly, 2013; Stephens, 2013; 
Wimmer, 2013). Most of these have applied the  approach as part of nation-building, 
examining the effects of decolonisation or unmaking of borders on the construction of 
national identity (see Jackson and Molokotos-Liederman, 2014 for detailed literature on this). 
However, study that sees ethnicity and nationalism as a tool of boundary creation or as 
human transactions is given less attention and the case of Nepal is no exception.   
 
Studies on Nepali nationalism was very limited until 1990 (Quigley 1987;  Burghart 1984; 
Rose, 1971;  Gaige 1975), however, there has been a profusion of studies on the subject since 
then, and most of them are dominated by anthropologists and political scientists (Gellner, 
Czarnecka and Whelpton 2008;  Malagodi 2008, 2013;  Lawoti and Hangen 2013;  
Hachhethu 2003; Onta 1996; Hutt 2012;  Rademacher 2007; Chalmers 2003). One of the 
most prominent post-1990 publications is the ethnographic collections which takes a long-
term view of the various processes of ethnic and national development and examines the 
ways that different political regimes have framed and attempted to control castes and ethnic 
groups (Gellner, Czarnecka and Whelpton 2008, originally published in 1997). This volume 
tangentially appreciates the role of boundary by dismissing the modernist presupposition that 
everyone has one and only one nation, or one and only one ethnic attachment and recognises 
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that people very often do have multiple and overlapping attachments, and as such they belong 
to one group for some purposes and other groups for different purposes (also see Gellner 
2001).   
 
A follow-up study on the consequences of ethnic mobilisation is presented in a more recent 
volume by Lawoti and Hangen (2013) that examines the rapid rise in ethnic and nationalist  
mobilization and conflict since 1990, the dynamics and trajectories of these movements, and 
their political consequences for Nepal. In the last decade the issue of Nepali nationalism has 
been discussed from various  perspectives: for example the debates on equality or social 
exclusion and inclusion  has strongly challenged the very premise of official Nepali 
nationalism (see Lawoti 2005; Bhattachan 2009; Giri 2010; Satyal 2011; Guring, Tamang 
and Turin 2014). Other studies on Nepali nationalism appreciates the role of history, 
language and culture in shaping how we are viewed and perceived by others (Hall 1996). For 
example, Hutt (2012) argues that Nepal's adoption of a new national anthem in 2007 reflected 
a decision to establish a new social and political order that was republican, federal and 
inclusive of the country's many minority communities. Similarly, Malagodi (2013) examines 
the complex relationship between law and politics, and emphasizes the role of cultural 
identity in making institutional choices relating to the framing and implementation of the 
Nepali Constitution. She also analyses the patterns of legal exclusion that resulted in the 
growing politicization of identity and the current demand for state-restructuring based on 
ethnic federalism and group rights. Though the above studies provide a good insight into the 
discourse of the historically transitional period and are helpful in the contextualised 
understanding of contemporary national narratives, they all focus on the internal ascription or 
self-identification. They do not provide complete picture of the formation of national identity 
because identities are negotiated within a particular historical context (Sahlins 1989) and 
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through the categorisation of a nation viz-a-viz other nations (Jenkins 2008): and this study 
intends to fill this gap.  
 
Methodology  
This paper applies qualitative methodology and relies on both primary and secondary data. 
The primary data was collected from online content analysis of editorial commentary pages 
in two Nepali newspapers published in both Nepali and English over a period of 4 months, 
comprising one month each year from 2010 to 2013. The two newspapers reviewed were: 
The Kathmandu Post and Nagarik dainik.  The analysis of media content is highly relevant 
because it plays a very important role in the spread and articulation of nationhood (Anderson 
1991). The Nepali equivalent term for nationalism is Rastriyata which is used 
interchangeably to mean nationhood, national identity and sometimes even patriotism. All 
editorial articles that contained discussion on nationalism and Rastriyata (in Nepali) were 
selected for analysis. A total of 26 editorial opinion pieces were studied. The choice of 
editorial articles for analysis was made because media commentators have preferential and 
active access to media and their opinions plays a big role in forming public discourses, as 
they are also the preferred actors of news reports and TV programmes (Van Dijk 1995).  
 
After the completion of the second year analysis, the researcher felt a need to interview some 
commentators for clarification. In-depth interviews were carried out through Skype with the 
selected 12 contributors to these newspapers through convenience sampling. These 
interviews covered issues discussed in their commentary and were greatly helpful in 
clarifying their meaning and context, as interviews are ‘historically, politically and 
contextually bound’ (Fontana and Frey 2005: 695). All interviews were transcribed in Word 




The selection of data and the identification of theme in qualitative research has been a 
contested area and it is often argued that it is subjective and biased.  However, we must 
acknowledge that ‘events and behaviours can have different meanings in different cultures or 
historical eras’ (Neuman 2003: 146). The interpretation of the findings presented in this 
research is strongly informed by the researcher’s own background in Nepal and the current 
socio-political context in Nepal. This is nothing new, but a feature of the qualitative method 
which applies an interpretive approach, and the researcher’s own understanding of the 
context of the social world he is studying is crucial. However, to overcome any bias that may 
come associated with the above, secondary data were consulted extensively throughout the 
research process.  
 
The reason for studying media content was because contemporary societies are mediated 
through discourse (Wetherell and Tylor 2001).  Though discourse is definable in different 
ways and there are various variants of analysis, for the purpose of this study it is defined as 
description and interpretation of meaning-making and meaning-understanding (Jaworski and 
Coupland 1999). This is  important when a society has gone through huge social change, 
because discourse is implicated in expressing people’s points of view and value systems, 
many of which are ‘prestructured’ in terms of what is ‘normal’ or ‘appropriate’ in particular 
social and institutional settings (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 6-7). The role of discourse in 
the construction of national identity is well acknowledged by researchers (see Wodak et al. 
1999). Questions may arise as this study is based on a relatively short time period in the four-
year span as previously mentioned. However, the author acknowledges that the purpose of 
discourse is not to show what absolute truth is, but to see how there are sometimes 
contradictory truths and different versions of the truth (Rapley 2007: 128).  Thus, the findings 
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presented here must be understood as one version of the many truths of the research question 
that drives this study.  
 
Cultural identity and boundary construction in Nepal  
Nepal is one of the oldest nations in South Asia. The country was established in the mid-18th 
century when a king of Gorkha set out to put together what would become present-day Nepal. 
For a long period of its history Nepal was in isolation and cut off from the outside world 
because of internal politics and restrictions imposed by British India. The formal 
establishment of Nepal’s political status came in 1923, when the restrictions on Nepalese 
diplomatic relationships and trade were finally removed.  Nepal’s isolation during the 18th 
and 19th century has a key role to play in the construction of its current ‘national’ character 
in two ways. First, it helped the various ethnicities to keep their distinctiveness; as a result 
Nepal now has an extremely diverse society with more than 100 ethnic and cultural groups 
(Sharma 2012).  Second, this isolation also involved the exception that it was integrated into 
the capitalist-dominated economy of India (Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon 1980), which had 
an effect on Nepal’s national polity that has always been characterised by its deeply 
apprehensive attitudes towards India.  However, Barth (1981) challenges the view that ethnic 
identities are developed or fostered in isolation. He argues that ethnic distinctions and 
cultural differences persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence. The 
development of Nepali cultural identity is a good example as we will see below.   
 
A real sense of Nepali nationhood only started to evolve after the nineteenth century,  when 
there started greater interaction with external forces, namely India. According to Burghart 
(1984), the demarcation of the border between British India and Nepal in 1816 sparked the 
formation of the concept of nation-state in Nepal. Other important episodes that played a 
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significant role in the development of nation-state are the designation of Nepali as the official 
language of Nepal (c.1930),  the implicit differentiation of the  monarchy from the state 
(c.1960); and  the formation of a culturally unique polity (c. 1960) (Burghart 1984). 
Burghart’s analysis is however, largely concerned with Hindu concepts, values and 
understanding and has been criticised for presenting nationalism as singular, unchallenged 
and promoting a dominant worldview (Hangen and Lawoti 2013). However, he is correct in 
pointing out that the mobilisation of cultural identity in the expression of Nepali nationalism 
came in the second half of the twentieth century.  Interestingly, it did not start in Nepal, but 
the formation of the cultural sense of Nepal’s identity was founded in India by a small group 
of expatriated Nepalis in British India.  Onta (1996) writes, ‘while Rana rulers of Nepal and 
their intellectual bards did not build a historical genealogy for the Nepali nation …the Nepali 
proto middle-class actors in British India did exactly that via the self-conscious fostering of 
the Nepali language and the writing of a bir (brave) history of the Nepali nation’ (Onta 1996: 
39).  
 
In 1960 the Nepalese King dissolved the elected parliament and introduced Panchayati 
system, a political system founded on absolute monarchy, which played a lead role in the 
shaping of modern Nepali national identity that was largely based on the Nepali language and 
hill identity. Efforts were made to create or invent a mono-cultural sense of ‘Nepaliness’ on 
the basis of its ‘unique’ culture that rested on the philosophy, ‘one nation, one language, one 
dress, one religion’ (Subba 2002: 129).  Various symbols and icons were invented and 
aggressively employed to give a distinctive sense of Nepali national identity, and institutions 
were created to advance this ‘nationalist’ project. For instance, Nepal Kala Sahistra 
Pratisthan later renamed as Nepal Rajkiya Pragya Pratisthan or ‘The Royal Academy’ was 
established under the king’s chairmanship to promote the ‘nation's glory’ in the name of the 
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development of literature, culture, art and knowledge. The academy made a significant 
contribution in the field of Nepali literature, culture, art and knowledge, though much of this 
has now been questioned by various linguistic groups.  
 
The use of language as a means to consolidate and assert Nepali identity occurred in 
conjunction with the emergence of linguistic nationalism in post-independence India.  For 
instance, in India self-governing states were created based on language (Chandra, Mukherjee 
and Mukherjee 2008). What the king could perhaps not understand was that language can 
sometimes act as disadvantage because it ‘erects a threshold, a tariff, which has to be met if 
one wishes to participate’ (McCrone 2001: 50).  In Nepal, the various linguistic groups that 
constituted more than two thirds of the population of Nepal never felt they were part of the 
king’s narratives.   
 
The Panchayati project was despotic in character though it did not necessarily force people to 
dissolve their identity. Burghart (1984) writes that the king respected the customs of different 
countries and registered the fact of this difference by various means.  Still, the assertion of  a 
singular Nepali identity had a far reaching effect in forging ‘Nepali’ identity. Until the 
eighteenth century, there was no modern nation called Nepal. Though there was some 
mention of the ‘Nepali’ nation in some pre-historic texts, this was largely made in reference 
to the kingdoms of the Kathmandu valley. In the absence of a nation of Nepal, the question of 
the collective noun ‘Nepali’, representing the inhabitants of present day Nepal, did not exist. 
Hamilton (1819: 246), who visited Nepal in 1801, noted that the nobles and soldiers of 
Gorkha, ‘despised the name Nepal’. Burghart (1984) writes that although the British referred 
to the Nepalese rulers as kings of Nepal, the members of the Shah dynasty prior to the 1930s 
thought of themselves as being kings from Gorkha. The Panchayati regime institutionally 
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recreated icons, symbols and representations which were mostly derived from Hindu 
mythologies as to represent the character of Nepaliness or ‘Nepalipan’ (Rademacher 2007: 
128). The regime indirectly forced individuals, groups and communities to personify the 
symbols in order to become culturally Sanskritised as Nepali. This contributed to the 
evolutionary process of creating a distinctive Nepali Jati (ethnicity) and helped create Nepali 
ethnicity as a historical community. 
 
The appropriateness of creating such an identity can be debated, but the invention of a 
collective noun or ‘national’ culture is not new.  Smith (1986) says that nationalists 
‘rediscover’ historical periods to legitimise their political strategies and to find lessons for the 
present. In fact there exists a theory of nationalism based on invented tradition.  Hobsbawm 
(1983) provides an historical theory of nationalism that lays emphasis on manufactured 
historical legacy constructed through ‘invented tradition’. He argues that all invented 
traditions use references to the past, not only to cement group cohesion but also for the 
legitimisation of action.   
 
Being an accomplished poet and song writer himself, the then Nepalese King Mahendra 
(1955-1972) was a cultural nationalist. The primary aim of cultural nationalists is to revive 
what they regard as a distinctive and primordial collective personality which has a name, 
unique origin, history, culture, homeland and social and political practices (Hutchison 1999). 
Such revivals are influenced by a particular perception of the threat to its national existence 
by a powerful neighbour or 'the Other'.  In Nepal’s case this ‘other’ was India. Many people 
would take the view that the threat from India was validated by its annexation of Sikkim, a 
small kingdom in the Himalayas in the early 1970s (for Sikkim’s annexation to India see 
Datta-Ray 2013; Kazi 1993). But this is not necessarily true. A Nepali psychologist has the 
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following to say on Nepalis’ perception of India five years before Sikkim was annexed to 
India:  
Nepalis had to reckon with the Indians so long and so often that they are more prone 
to infer the latters’ intents quickly than to observe their overt behaviour. Due to the 
high degree of intimacy between the two countries through the ages, whatever the 
Indians do in actual practice is not considered as important as what the Nepalis think 
the Indians mean (Bhuwan Lal Joshi in Rose 1971: 16).   
 
The Nepali king did try to exploit  anti-India feeling and consolidate his power by infusing 
the cultural sense with the political, and presenting himself as a saviour of Nepalis  
everywhere. He invited noted literati from Nepali diasporas, particularly in northeast India, to 
live and settle in Nepal. Such a gesture by the king was important in bringing the political 
and cultural dimension of Nepali identity closer. One of the strong  proponents of that 
philosophy is the dethroned King Gyanendra. He still tries to claim the monarchy’s return is 
necessary for the existence of the Nepali nation and questions, ‘mulukai narahe hami kasari 
Nepali?, which translates into English: ‘how will we remain (Nepali) without the existence of 
the Nepali nation?’ (Shah 2012).  According to Pradhan (1982), the word ‘Nepali’ connotes 
three different meanings, viz. a language, a citizen of Nepal, and a cultural identity. The 
king’s statement muddles the latter two, to make a claim that the existence of a separate 
Nepali state is vital for the distinctive identity of Nepalis all over the world. Such muddling is 
also prevalent at the people’s level in various forms (see Maharjan 2012).  
 
The choice of the word Muluk by the king to refer to Nepal or the country also has 
significance. Muluk has a unique connotation in the Nepali language. The Gorkha rulers, the 
forefathers of the Nepali kings, claimed their sovereignty by exercising propriety authority 
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over their possessions (muluk), and ritual authority within their realm (desa) and various 
countries (also desa or des) in which the kings’ tenants or subjects were natives who claimed 
certain rights to their land and way of life on the basis of ancestral authority (Burhgart 1984: 
103).  Each of these three concepts – possessions, realm, and country – specified a different 
relationship between ruler, land, and people, and each was legitimised with respect to 
different kinds of authority – propriety, ritual, and ancestral (1984: 103).  The boundaries 
between the three were not always the same and use of the term was to claim cultural 
propriety over greater territory. The kings, thus, often used Muluk to claim cultural authority 
not only within Nepal but also transcending the political boundary to reach people in  
northeast India.  Muluk can also mean ‘homeland’.  The ex-king’s reference can be 
interpreted as meaning that the absence of homeland is tantamount to the loss of Nepali 
identity, no matter where Nepalis live.  
 
The Panchayati version of state-sponsored nationalism has received much condemnation 
over the last two and half decades. However, we could also see this from an historical 
perspective. With the emergence of new nations in the former colonial territories of Asia and 
Europe, the idea of nation-building and national integration was in vogue. The central 
premise was that the population of the state, or the citizenry, is progressively welded into a 
‘nation’ in the crucible of a bounded and relatively homogenous transactional and 
communicative space.  That space is defined and delimited by state-wide social, political, 
economic and cultural institutions and processes (Brubaker 1992: 80). The intervention of the 
Panchayati state created such homogeneity, and its approach was similar to the ‘official 
nationalism’ (Seton-Watson’s term) of imperial governments in Europe.  
 
In 1990, Nepal adopted a multiparty parliamentary democracy.  The erstwhile state-
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sponsored nationalism became less relevant and cultural homogeneity was strongly disputed., 
The Tibeto-Burman hill communities challenged the notion of one nation, one identity 
(Subba 2002: 129)  (For a detailed commentary on the politics of ethnic identity since the 
mid-1990s see Whelpton, Gellner and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2008; Shneiderman 2014; Lecomte-
Tilouine 2009).  T.B. Subba (2002) endorses the view that the present crisis of Nepali 
national identity has to do mainly with the earlier attempt to impose a monolithic and 
homogenous Nepali identity on all Nepalis.  
 
However, people’s discontent with the exclusionary polity of the past was very strong and 
Nepal has now adopted a policy of appeasement to address this.  As a result, there are now 40 
public holidays, of which 35 exist for celebrating vernacular culture in order to appreciate 
multiculturalism, though majority of them are still labelled Khas-Arya holidays.  Despite 
having the highest number of public holidays of any country, there is no dedicated ‘national’ 
day in Nepal. Though some scholars believe that national days have no real function in a 
secular age, others take the view that they are commemorative devices in time and place for 
reinforcing national identity and cannot be overlooked altogether (McCrone and McPherson  
2009).  Inability to agree on a ‘national’ day or a ‘national culture’  is distressing  if we 
consider that nationalism draws on all kinds of sources - myth, legend, religion, history, art, 
culture, language, literature - to create a cult of the nation (Smith 2008). However, there has 
been some voice raised lately to reinstate Prithvi Jayanti to mark the birthday of King Prithvi 
Narayan Shah who founded Nepal. Does this mean the glue that binds the Nepali nation is 
losing its strength? I believe it would be wrong to think so.  However, the manifestation of 
national identity has definitely changed. Until now we have argued that Nepali identity has 
been largely shaped by its long interaction with the external elements and has created a 
distinctive boundary, mainly with India and China.  The following section argues that 
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contemporary articulation of Nepali national identity is geared towards maintaining this 
boundary, which now occupies the central position in the narrative of the Nepali nation.  
 
 Contemporary public discourse on Nepali nationalism 
Contemporary public discourse on nationalism is largely skewed towards the political end of 
the nationalism continuum and the external, not internal, factor looms large in the nationalism 
debate.  To some scholars the external factor was superior and crucial (see Rose 1971); 
however, others have argued that both internal and external elements contributed to shaping 
Nepali national identity. For example, Burghart (1994) argues that Nepal legitimised the 
basis of its policy in a way that made sense not only to its own subjects but also to the British 
and later to the government of India.  Similarly, Clarke (1995) argues that the formation of 
modern ethnic and national identities in Nepal is the result of the successive interplay of two 
principles of association in civil society, namely ‘blood’ or kinship, and ‘territory’. 
According to Clarke, this is on the one hand the history of contact with the British Raj and 
the overall imperial relations from the late eighteenth century, and on the other it is also an 
account of a transition of local socio-cultural forms in a more traditional Asian hierarchy, 
with a change to more modern territorial forms of imperial integration.  
 
The association of nationalism with national existence has been the leitmotif in the narrative 
of Nepali nationalism. It began with the founder king of Gorkha, who in the eighteenth 
century unified small scattered principalities into  present day Nepal and declared, ‘this 
Kingdom is like a traul (yam) between two boulders. Great friendship should be maintained 
with the Chinese Empire. Friendship should also be maintained with the emperor beyond the 
southern seas,’ a reference to Great Britain, then increasingly exercising power over India 
(Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012: 288). Since that time, balancing its relations between its 
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northern and southern neighbors has remained central to the existence of the Nepali nation. 
The prolonged exposure to India, whilst remaining in relative isolation from the rest of the 
world since its formation to the early 1950s, has made Nepal wary of Indian intentions and 
any serious engagement with India receives strong resistance and is dubbed as anti-
nationalist. This is more with leftist parties. A commentator stated (R7), ‘Nepali leftists 
believe that all political parties except them are Indian agents and status quoists and 
sometimes this could be their own comrades’. The latest example is when the Maoist Prime 
Minister signed a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement treaty with India 
in 2011. He was instantly accused of being an ‘Indian agent and anti-nationalist’. However, 
the interpretation of nationalism for the Maoist PM was, ‘we should expand the economic 
partnership, increase investment to achieve economic prosperity and redefine our external 
relations; that could be the new base for Nepali nationalism.’(Bhattarai 2011a).  Examples are 
numerous that show the Nepali interpretation of nationalism to be an idea related  to the 
maintenance of external relations to protect its existence and defend its independence. We 
also see that the economy takes centre stage in these narratives,  
We cannot protect our nationalism without achieving economic development and 
prosperity. When China and India has achieved rapid development, we cannot 
preserve our nationalism in poverty and underdevelopment. We cannot achieve 
prosperity without attracting foreign investment.’ (Bhattarai 2011b) 
 
A member of a communist party, also a political commentator,  took the view that in the 
twenty-first century it is not possible to remain in isolation and thus the only option available 
for Nepal is to engage and integrate into the world system. He (R2) further said,  
Talking about nationalism, it has been established since the time of King Prithvi 
Narayan Shah that Nepal should balance its relations with both India and China. 
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During the time of bourgeois rule it was believed that Nepal can protect its nationality 
by acting as a buffer or wall between the two giant nations. In the twenty first century 
we can now become a thriving bridge between these two nations and protect our 
nationalism with economic wealth and internal unity. We should construct our 
nationalism that strengthens our unity internally and become a dynamic bridge 
connecting the two neighbours.  
 
Material and economic interests can be important, but the traditional idea of nationalism 
advocates that they do not capture the essence of nationalism in totality (McCrone 2001:  48). 
Some scholars contradict the above views. For example, Bond, McCrone and Brown (2003) 
argue that, informed by the past, economic agents mobilise national identity through the 
process of reiteration, recapture, reinterpretation and repudiation. However, Nepal’s 
geopolitical situation would mean that its vulnerability is not reduced by the economic 
prosperity of India and China.  Scott (2008) argues that with their growing economic 
capacity, both India and China have ‘widening geopolitical horizons’ and that ‘they both 
strive to stamp their authority on the same region (2008: 1).  
 
Nepal assumes an important place in a geo-political sense, especially since China took over 
Tibet in 1950. China has built up its military presence in Tibet and permanent long-distance 
highways and railway lines have been built - an indication of China’s anxiety concerning 
Tibet (Scott 2008).   Nepal’s apprehension on China’s intent in Nepal has been relatively low 
until very recently. For example, Joshi wrote in the early 1970s that, ‘(H)istorically, the 
Nepalis had so few occasions to become acquainted with the Chinese mind that they are still 
in the process of observing Chinese overt behaviour vis-à-vis Nepal. In spite of all that has 
happened between China and India in recent years, Nepali elites are still declined to probe 
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into Chinese intents and motives.’ (Bhuwan Lal Joshi in Rose, 1971, p. 16). However, this 
has started to change and Nepal is more aware of China’s adventurism in the region’s 
geopolitics. For example, when Maoist Chairman Prachanda backed a Chinese NGOs 
proposal to develop Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, as a premier tourism 
destination, Nepali press strongly opposed it accusing he was ‘hijacking’ Lumbini’ as a 
‘China card’ to vent his vengeance against India which risk angering India. A prominent 
Nepali journalist viewed it as a Chinese design to instigate geopolitical race in Nepal (Dixit, 
2011).  Such opinions show that external elements are important in Nepal’s national 
consciousness and vital for its national interest. A commentator (R8) responded, ‘(W)ith 
Lumbini’s heritage sites less than 4 km from the Indian border at its closest, the project hold 
out the danger of raising a reaction from India and triggering geopolitical competition that 
would harm Nepali interests’  
 
Many commentators took the view that the Lumbini controversy instigated a new chapter in 
Nepali nationalism. A commentator (R10) stated, ‘the public outcry against China’s 
involvement in Lumbini’s development is the evidence of a boundary with its northern 
neighbour. The China as ‘the other’ was never expressed so strongly than in the Lumbini 
case’. There was some common understanding amongst the commentators that the creation of 
boundary between India and China is a wrong nationalist project though. A respondent (R9) 
said, ‘we should construct our nationalism that strengthens our unity internally and become a 
dynamic bridge connecting the two neighbours… we should expand our economic 
partnership, increase investment to achieve economic prosperity and reconfigure our external 
relations; that could be the new base for Nepali nationalism’. 
 
However, the above examples are useful in understanding the role of external elements in the 
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nationalism debate. While many scholars take the view that national identity and nation are 
complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components - ethnic, cultural, 
territorial, economic, legal and political - the Nepali case adds an external element to this list. 
The contemporary interpretation of Nepali selfhood is defined not only by internal 
components but there is an important exogenous element which is a key to its independence 
and existence. This external element remained largely latent after British India governed its 
polities through the Rana oligarchy. However, the changed political context has brought it to 
the fore in understanding contemporary Nepali nationhood, exemplifying that nation or 
national identity is not a static concept. It is constantly changing and is fed by ever-evolving 
internal and external conditions.    
 
External factors, sovereignty and independence are so rooted in the public discourse of 
nationalism that the question of how an individual identifies with the nation makes very little 
sense. At a conference in 2012 organised to deliberate on emerging trends in Nepali 
nationalism, a young politician, Gagan Thapa, viewed nationalism as being about how one 
would like to relate with the nation. His idea was dismissed outright by a noted columnist in 
his article next day, saying such an idea trivialises a serious national issue (Baral 2012).   But 
what Thapa believes in is strongly founded on the idea of ‘personal nationalism’ by Cohen 
(1996).  Cohen assigns the primacy of actors of their selfhood and self-identity as 'personal 
nationalism'.  That is, one can see the nation by looking at oneself.  According to Cohen, by 
looking at oneself, or one's experience, one’s reading of history, perception of the landscape, 
and reading of literature and music, one can see the nation. It is on sharing personal 
experiences that sentiment and attachment to the nation is predicated. Thus, self-identity 
takes a very important role in the construction of nationalism, however such an idea is alien 




Discourse on nationalism is expanding in scope. Breuilly states that the concept of state 
modernisation provides the key to contextualising nationalism (2001: 51).  The narrative that 
was largely produced by a hill-centred perspective has now been challenged by various ethnic 
groups and the movements based on ethnicity, language, caste, religion, and regional identity 
have become increasingly central players in reshaping debates on the definition of the Nepal 
nation, nationalism and the structure of the Nepali state (Hangen and Lawoti, 2013). These 
indigenous nationalities and groups are in action demanding their autonomous homeland 
within the federal Nepal, for example, Newars are demanding a separate Newa province in 
central Nepal, Madheshis in the southern plains, Limbus in the eastern Nepal, Tharus in the 
western  plains and so on. At the time of writing this paper, the country was witnessing 
several violent incidents across the southern plains against the proposed 7  state federal setup 
in the new  constitution adopted in September  2015. In the most violent and shocking event, 
seven security personnel and a child were killed in a clash that ensued between Tharuhat 
activists and police at Tikapur in the western  Kailali district. 
 
The main contention in the new constitution has come from  the southern plains  often 
referred to as Terai or Madhesh, the region that borders India and is socio-culturally close to 
it. For their proximity to India, they are often seen as the ‘other’ in Nepal. At the time writing 
this paper the entire Terai region was shut down due to protest against some of the provisions 
of the new constitution, one of them being the contention over citizenship provisions. Though 
the last minute changes in the citizenship provisions authorizes women to confer citizenship 
to their children, on par with men, but women groups and the Madhesi community still argue 
that further change is necessary lest the provisions make women ‘second class’ citizens. The 
main three parties argue that the geopolitical situation, and the large populations of 
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neighboring countries India and China, compels them to restrict unwanted population growth 
(Phuyal, 2015). 
 
The role of India in the recent political change that ended the monarchy was very prominent 
and since then the southern plains have acquired considerable importance in Nepali polity: 
national debate is strongly informed by them. In order to test whether the external element is 
only confined within the dominant mainstream debate, this researcher also looked into the 
discourse produced by some provincial commentators from the Terai region. A prominent 
policy think-tank asked a noted columnist to author a ‘think paper’ to invite debate on a ‘new 
basis of Nepali identity’ (Lal 2012: 2).  Lal (2012: 57) argues, ‘nationality cannot be 
strengthened without putting foreign policy and relations with close neighbors on a sound 
footing’. Such a strong assertion of external relations, mainly with India, being instrumental 
in Nepali nationalism indirectly acknowledges the semi-colonial mindset in Nepal, believed 
some respondents. However, they also provide insight into the overlapping attachments of 
Madheshis to India.  
 
This is articulated by another commentator, Pramod Mishra, who mentions two features of 
Nepali nationalism: external and internal, the former related to the southern neighbour 
beyond the border and the latter related to southern people within the border.  According to 
Mishra, the people from Terai have yet to be properly integrated into the Nepali national 
imagination (Mishra 2010a&b). Though this view is in no way separatist, it could be 
interpreted as advocating a dilution of nationalism by bringing Nepali identity closer towards 
that of India, and is questioned in Kathmandu-based discussions. Commentators such as 
Prashant Jha challenge such questions. He writes:  ‘Madheshis are Nepalis—but they wish to 
be Nepalis on terms set by them, not by the Kathmandu establishment (Jha, 2011).’ The case 
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of new discourse advanced by Jha could best be described a form of dissident narrative. 
Attwell (2013) argues that Israeli dissidents use alternative national identity discourses to 
overcome symbolic boundaries. The Madheshi case echoes the case of multiple attachments 
and shows that they belong to a group that has one kind of identity in relation to some groups 
and a different sort of identity in relation to other groups (Gellner 2001).   
 
These examples also strengthen the argument that being Nepali can mean different things to 
different Nepalis (Whelpton 2009).  McCrone (2005) argues that there is a ‘frame of 
reference’, a prism, through which social, economic and political processes are refracted and 
the same or similar social attitudes or values will take on different forms of political 
expression. The Terai ‘frame of reference’ interprets Nepali identity within a larger Indian 
cultural unity, which is distinctively different from the people from the hills (see Gaige 
1976); though we must also note that the word ‘India’ itself originally was a 
cultural/geographical term. The development of such a ‘reference’, which was very limited 
until 2008, confirms Pecheux’s (1982) theory of how societies are organised through their 
ideological struggles, and how particular groups will be either more or less privileged in their 
access to particular discourse network.   
 
It is believed that external threat brings communities together, constructing a common sense 
of community and plays an important role in arousing powerful nationalist emotions 
(Ashworth 1991). This is why many countries emphasise a shared history struggle through 
cultural icons such as heritage, memorials, national days and so on, to engender a sense of 
collective patriotism. On very few occasions the factor of internal co-existence is mentioned. 
One example of this was, during the Hindu festival Dashain, Nepal’s first President stated, 
‘the Nepali nationalism that draws its strength from ethnic goodwill, religious and cultural 
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tolerance and social unity and territorial integrity is our pride’ (Nepal News 2010).  
 
To some commentators the over-emphasis on external factors means that contemporary 
debate on Nepali nationalism has lost its focus and relevance. A noted scholar has said, 
‘(N)ationalism is about ourselves. We should get rid of this conception that it is about India 
or China’ (Baral 2011). Echoing his views,  another respondent opined, ‘we should stop 
condemning these rubbishes…this kind of nationalism needs to be engaged, refuted and 
moderated in order to shift the focus from anti-India obsession to building people’s lives and 
the country’ (R4). True nation building is building people’s lives within the state rather than 
remaining obsessed with your neighbour (Mishra 2010c).  However, such views are still very 




In this study I have shown that the expression of Nepali nationalism is largely intended to 
maintain a boundary with outsiders. The increased interaction and interdependence with  
external elements after the 1816 Nepal-India Border Treaty has played an instrumental role in 
fostering a sense of identity based on ‘Nepaliness’ or forged Nepali ethnicity. The 
articulation of Nepali nationalism is largely driven by this distinctive identification in which 
external elements are key factors. I also showed that the cultural feature that signal the 
boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be 
transformed, indeed, even the organisational form of the group may change – yet the fact of 
continuing dichotomisation between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of 
continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content (Barth 1981). I have also 
shown that in the newly evolved political context, there has been a change in the form of 
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manifestation; however the boundary still persists in the name of nationalism where India and 
China are the ‘Others’. Such an articulation of Nepali nationalism is original and exemplifies 
Billig’s (2012: 6) idea that nationalism is ‘endemic’ in nature, shaped by its national 
specificities.  
 
The Nepali example is useful in understanding the role of external elements in the 
nationalism debate. While many scholars take the view that national identity and nation are 
complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components - ethnic, cultural, 
territorial, economic, legal and political - the Nepali case adds an external element to this list. 
The contemporary interpretation of Nepali selfhood is defined not only by internal 
components but there is also an important exogenous element which is a key to its 
independence and existence. This external element remained largely latent in bygone eras; 
however, the changed political context has brought it to the fore in understanding 
contemporary Nepali nationhood, exemplifying that nation or national identity is not a static 
concept. It is constantly changing and is fed by ever evolving internal and external 
conditions.    
 
This study reiterates that nationalism is a multi-dimensional concept.  It is the interplay 
between what we might term formal (state level) and informal (popular) narrations of a 
nation. It is also about the interaction between cultural and political spheres, the interface 
between ethnic and civic variants, and the exemplification of internal and external conditions. 
The question of which of the above assumes a central position is explained by the dominant 
ideology thesis which states that governments, or ruling elites, will project a message 
legitimising their position (see Habermas, 1971, 1973).  Bourdieu (1977) postulates the 
existence of so called ‘cultural capital’ which, according to him, is the key to legitimising the 
 28 
 
exercise of political power to appropriate the control over this capital by any regime.  
 
Understanding nationalism can be important in comprehending the country’s international 
behaviour (Carlson 2011; Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007).  The international relations 
theory suggests that nationalism can shape the state’s international relations because what 
people expect from their state influences its international behaviour (Stullerova 2014).  
Notwithstanding, whether it is good or bad, Nepal’s greater interaction with India means that 
its identity is often expressed vis-a-vis India and we have seen in this paper that this has 
created a stronger boundary with India. Thus, India’s concern for the people of Terai and 
other marginalised groups in the new constitution has been opposed by the majority of Nepali 
people who still associate themselves strongly with Hill identity. Deutsch (1969: 26) argues 
that when a national minority remains discriminated against for year after year, ‘the nation 
has a prescription for political dynamite’, and being a closest neighbour India might be driven 
by such worries. However, the Nepali government’s reaction to Madheshi demands has been 
driven by peoples’ ‘perceived’ differences with India, and for the majority of Nepalis, 
Madhesi identity is an extension of Indian identity. Gellner (1983) contends that nationalism 
would moderate once the transition had been accomplished and societies become affluent (cf. 
Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007), and until Nepal achieves transition to economic and 
political stability, external element, namely India, would remain a factor in Nepal’s virulent 
form of nationalism. 
 
However, this study has shown that imposition of identity by the state in Nepal has created a 
tension between the previous version shaped by ‘dominant’ national culture and the newly 
grown ethnic consciousness that discards it. The predominant script of Nepali nationalism 
that was written from the Panchayati perspective resting on Hindu monarchy has lost its 
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traction and the prevailing concept of the nation proposed by the new political regime 
introduced in the 1990s – anchored in a drive for cultural homogeneity that has been stressed 
with through the 1950s – is outmoded. This finding reaffirms Pecheux’s (1982) contention 
that any one particular discourse or discursive formation stands ‘at the level of social 
organisation’, in conflict with other discourses. This paper was based on the discourse 
produced by media commentators; however, it would be interesting to see how the various 
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